Is that GitHub repo a trap?
Paste a repo link and check it for fake-interview malware before you run it.
See what it detects · every technique, measured
How the “fake interview” scam works
- 1
Someone reaches out
Usually a recruiter, on LinkedIn or Telegram, for an attractive remote role at a crypto, Web3, AI, or fintech company you can't quite verify. It is not always hiring, though: the same approach arrives as a client, a collaborator, or someone asking you to look over their project.
- 2
You are asked to look at a repo
Sometimes it is a take-home task: clone it, run npm install, fix a small bug, report back. Sometimes there is no task at all, just “have a look, see how it works, and open it in an editor so you can read it properly.” That last instruction is not the setup for the attack. For a whole class of these, it is the attack.
- 3
The trap springs on its own
Hidden inside the project, typically in an install script or an innocent-looking config file, is code that runs automatically. Usually npm install or npm run dev fires it, but often nothing needs installing at all: a repo can ship a VS Code task, an MCP server, a dev container, or an editor hook that runs the moment you open the folder. You never even have to open the malicious file.
- 4
It steals what's on your machine
The payload hunts for browser passwords and cookies, crypto wallets and extensions like MetaMask, SSH keys, and API keys in your environment, and quietly uploads them. Some variants install a backdoor for later.
The golden rule: never run code from a stranger, and do not even open it, on the machine that holds your passwords and wallets. Opening a folder in an editor already runs whatever the repo told the editor to start. A legitimate interviewer will not mind if you review the code on GitHub first, ask questions, or use a throwaway virtual machine.
What RepoCanary checks
- Scripts that auto-run on npm install (preinstall / postinstall)
- Obfuscated or minified code hiding in normal-looking files
- Code that reads your passwords, keys, or environment secrets and sends them out
- References to crypto wallets, browser data, and keychains
- Code that downloads and executes more code from the internet
- Auto-run traps across ecosystems: npm, PyPI, composer, gems, Yarn, Docker, direnv, and CI
- Code that fires when you merely open the folder: VS Code tasks and tool paths, MCP servers, AI agent hooks, dev containers, and Emacs or Neovim project config
- Lockfiles that quietly install something other than what package.json declares
- Fishy account signals: brand-new orgs, empty “companies”, typosquatted packages
Every technique is catalogued and measured against a threat corpus, with the exact rules that fire on each. See the full coverage catalog.
In your terminal or CI
The same engine runs as a CLI with no install and as a GitHub Action, with JSON and SARIF output and exit codes a pipeline can gate on. Open source, zero runtime dependencies.
npx repocanary owner/repo